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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030139-CA
v.
GORDON LEE WALLS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea
to murder, a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the "pour-over"
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Should this Court reach defendant's claims that his plea was taken in
violation of rule 11 where defendant did not raise those claims in his
motion to withdraw before the trial court?1
No standard of review applies to this issue.

defendant raises a rule 11 claim challenging his competency in Point I of his
brief. He raises a rule 11 claim challenging the value of the State's promise in Point II of
his brief. To avoid repetition, the State addresses both these claims in Point I of its brief.
Also, although defendant in Point I arguably does not present a constitutional
claim challenging his competency that is distinguishable from his rule 11 claim,
defendant does cite to due process and constitutional law to support his overall argument.
The State therefore treats defendant's competency argument as raising both a rule 11
(addressed in Point I of the State's brief) and a constitutional claim (addressed in Point II
of the State's brief).

II.

Should this Court reach defendant's constitutional claim that he was
incompetent to plead guilty where defendant fails to marshal the
evidence supporting the trial court's competency finding?
This Court "'review[s] a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea

under an "abuse of discretion" standard, incorporating the "clearly erroneous" standard
for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision.'" State v.
Visser, 2001 UT App 215, f 7, 31 P.3d 584 (quoting State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433
(Utah 1996)), cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135 (Utah 2001). "The determination of whether a
defendant is competent to proceed . . . is a mixed question of fact and law." State v.
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah 1997). However, "[t]he trial court's factual
findings in support of its determination of malingering and its accompanying credibility
determinations are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999) and Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
are relevant to this appeal and are reproduced at Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE and STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The crime? In the afternoon of June 11, 2001, defendant's mother, Mary Scott,
was watching her soap operas when an old friend, Jake Roberts, came by with a bottle of
whiskey (R. 185:43). Mary and Jake were drinking and talking when Mary's live-in
boyfriend, Craig Tillet, entered the living room from their apartment's only bedroom (R.

2

Because no trial was held in this case, the facts of the crime are taken from the
preliminary hearing transcript and defendant's plea hearing.
2

185:44, 46). Within a short while, Craig got mad at Mary and started calling her names
and "slimeballing" her (R. 185:44, 52). Jake then offered Mary some marijuana, and the
two of them smoked some (R. 185:44). Mary soon fell asleep on the living room couch
(R. 185:45).
A short while later, Mary was awakened by noise from the bedroom where
defendant and Craig were arguing and threatening each other (R. 185:45-46). Mary, who
had previously had trouble with defendant, told them to stop arguing or she was going to
call the police (R. 185:46, 48, 53).
Shortly thereafter, defendant came into the living room yelling and throwing things
(R. 185:47). After briefly stopping at the bathroom, defendant then ran out the back door
(R. 185:46, 48). Mary went back to sleep (R. 184:47).
Mary was later awakened by her dog, who was scratching at the bedroom door (R.
185:47). As Mary opened the door to let the dog in, Mary noticed Craig lying on the
floor next to the bed (R. 185:47). When Mary tried to wake Craig, she noticed blood on
him (R. 185:47). As she continued to try to wake him, she turned his head and saw more
blood (R. 185:48). Mary then called 911, reported that Craig was on the floor with blood
all around him, and told the dispatcher that she thought her son did it (R. 185:18-19, 48).
Mary explained that her son "gets real violent when he is drinking" and that he "is the
only one who could have done this" (R. 185:22).
Defendant was arrested later that evening (R. 185:22). In his left back pocket,
police found Craig's wallet (R. 185:70).

3

While awaiting trial, defendant told an inmate that he and Craig had been arguing
that night, that he had kicked Craig several times in the head, and that, although he knew
Craig was dying, he did not call the police because he didn't want to get in trouble (R.
185:97-98, 104-05).
Craig died from injury to the brain secondary to a lack of oxygen to the brain (R.
185:30). The precipitating event was multiple blunt force injuries to the head combined
with a state of intoxication (R. 185:30-31). Craig sustained abrasions on his upper left
forehead and an abrasion and laceration above the right eyebrow (R. 185:34). In addition,
both the back and front of both of Craig's ears were bruised (R. 185:34). Craig also had
bruises on the back of his head near the upper part of his neck, on both his arms, and over
his left chest (R. 185:34).
Once Craig's head was shaven, bruise patterns became visible (R. 185:35-36).
Several of those patterns matched the soles of the shoes defendant was wearing when he
was arrested (R. 185:24, 27, 36).
The plea. On June 15, 2001, defendant was charged with murder, a first degree
felony (R. 10-11). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on that charge
(R. 78).
On March 26, 2002, defendant pleaded guilty to murder as charged (R. 99; R.
186:2-14). As part of that plea, defendant signed a statement in support of his plea (R.
102-08). In exchange for defendant's plea, the State agreed to send a letter to the Board
of Pardons requesting that defendant serve between ten and twelve years of the statutory

4

five-years-:.-

.

•

' -^n-i in: " v ou should also

. .. , f ibt | ) e c a u s e the State writes a letter to the parole authority doesn't mean
t:ie} have- • (oILw their recommendation" (R 186:7). Defendant replied,'Y caii. . \e
^een told thai • •

*.,!...

.'In SI.ili Lis iikL .ifnl tlic\ iii.t' r\ in.r, r " <In in petering this sentence because you
could serve a lot longer than what they're going to recommend" (R 186:7-8). Defendant
responded, "Yea?"

T

Vnnw" fR

1

<?£-Q>

Finally, before accepting c* icn^r.;; . >;;

following ensued:
Court:

And are you supposed to be taking any kind of drugs
that you're not taking?

Defendan' T-Vell, they—they're supposed to be giving me
Thorazine, h\:t I told them I didn't w ant to take it.

Defendant.

Haldol.

Court

How- how are -how is your mental state today? Are
you thinking clearly?

Court:

Ha\ e you understood everything I've told you toda>
about your rights?

Ukav And lias
In \ on hv a physician.:1
Defendai.

.•!< the iail

Court:

*-. =., ,:.

\\\x< llmm/int1 brcti prescribed

e

Defendant:

Yeah.

Court:

Okay.

Defendant:

So I guess it's a physician.

Court:

And for what purpose was that given?

Defendant:

I don't remember.

Court:

You don't—you're not sure?

Defendant:

(Shakes head.)

Court:

Okay.

Defense Counsel: For the record, Your Honor, I've talked to Mr.
Walls extensively twice over the last couple of weeks and he
has shown that he has understood what we've talked about
and we've engaged in reasonable discussions. He's
understood and asked relevant questions.
Court:

Okay. And, again, have you understood everything
today I've told you?

Defendant:

Yes.

(R. 186:9-10).
During the plea hearing, defendant responded appropriately to every question
asked by the court (R. 186:2-13, 15). On multiple occasions, defendant expressly told the
court that he understood what he was pleading to, the sentence which applied to his
crime, and the rights he was giving up as a result of his plea (R. 186:2-8, 10). Once, after
nodding to the judge in response to a question and being told that he had to respond out
loud, defendant followed the court's direction, verbalizing his answer (R. 186:2-3).

6

•ii * plea and prior to his
sentencing, defendant moved pro se to withdraw his plea, alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel (R ' **

The State objected to deiei.dan= - M^iion, arguing that

defendant liaa enicjvw ..*. , ka I iiuuiiijj) an I ilmil.n il
11

111 • iidu.ituu lie \\<i^ satisfied

miniM^li i U I i ni ni I ii'ton'l'inl was subsequently appointed new counsel (R. 112).
On August 6, 2002, a hearing was held on defendant's motion (R ! ? n

Ax

*u~*

time, defense counsel indicated ihiv . :., r ne of the big issues on *

^

" •. - -! and vuiuntanl^ and mtclli^entK enter into the plea negotiations on this
matter" (R. 181:6). Defense counsel then asked that the court appoint two alienists to
j~*

;— whetnv,: .i^iCiiuant was compe^;
•• ^ r

v iiic^t <R. l b i . 7 j .

Rhcii

l>ottci", a licensed clinical social worker, and Dr. Rick Hawks, a licensed psychologist,
were appointed as alienists (R 179; R 183:13,29),
I Mi h o v c i i i l v t JM Jl»» " ". ni

••!!'••

I'MIU.IIV

,.»>,, ,'IMM llii;- iii.il

nil held addili.in il

- M-*nuant's motion vR. l£>->, 184). At both hearings, defense counsel told the

..our ih;u **ihe RI.1L- I i colloui;: ri:i connection with defendant'" pica] was done
adequately ana. ... ;aet. even mor.

\I\A-.

... .

adequutds" <u
>t defendant in connection with defendant's

plea (R. 183. iu, R. 154:45-45;. Counsel's only concern was whether defendant was
competent at the time he entered his plea (R 184:45-48).

7

In his written evaluation, Rhett Potter noted that defendant was "oriented to
person, time, place, and situation" (R. 179:Potter's Rep. at 1). Moreover, defendant
"seemed to be of normal intelligence" and "he expressed himself adequately . .. [with] an
adequate grasp of language" (Id.). Potter noticed "no indications of hallucinations,
delusions, tangential thought, or loose associations," and found "no thought process
disorders" with defendant (Id.).
Although Potter noted that defendant claimed he was hearing voices, Potter
concluded that defendant's symptoms were "atypical in my experience with people who
have auditory hallucinations" (R. 179:Potter's Rep. at 2). Thus, Potter "doubt[ed] the
veracity of [defendant's] claims," noting that "[t]hey seem to be a convenient
explanation/excuse for [defendant's] behavior" and "are probably a manipulative device"
used by defendant (Id.).
Finally, Potter noted that defendant's "[r]ecent and remote memory were intact"
and that defendant's "letters to the Court and to his defense attorney show a good grasp of
the charges, the judicial process, and alternative defenses" (Id.). Potter then concluded
that "there is no mental disorder to impact the nature and quality of the defendant's
relationship with counsel" (Id. at 3). Moreover, in Potter's "professional opinion . . .,
[defendant] was mentally competent at the time he entered his plea of guilty" (Id.).
Consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(4)(a) (1999), Potter found that defendant was:
i.
ii.

capable to comprehend and appreciate the charges or
allegations against him;
able to disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of
mind;
8

iii. ' able to comprehend and appreciate the range ana i.ai.irj »>{
• possible penalties, if applicable, that mnv be ^vp<^c l m ^proceedings against him;
iv.
able to engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and
options;
v.
able to understand the adversary nature of the proceedings
against him;
vi.
able to manifest appropriate courtroom behavior;
vii
able to testify relevantly, if applicable,
II

I ' »PnftH

s Rffi

,ll ' i |

.

'

'

•'

'

Potter testified before the trial court on November 20, 2002 I'R. 1S?) \i »:-:.*.: t:mt\
PfHte* jlarified that his evaluation was to determine ^ i,cu.^ \ aetendant was currc.:.
rompeten

.

• .
i nave conducted the same interview but may have reviewed

the plea video ana talked v\uh defense counsel and the prosecutor (R. 183:26-27),
Still, Potter re-iterated much vi ua, .niwrmdtU'ii ;n his repor t,
, ,-:IL

• .

/,

l

-

* •* /i, ii "seemed

-• vva^ trackir^ ^propri.'itoh ^ jjlat {1C understood what the charges were, he
understood the possible penalties *P *S? 1 ^
person would not tiawk \.m\ \--.... .. . *
.,.,,.*

p

otter testified that an incompetent
.hi (I il ildnhlaiif\ irmnir in.) nvrni

-* <>rted Potter's conclusion, although Potter noted that he

did not do any psychological testing on defendant (R. 183:22).
Finally, Potter'reiterated that although voices and schizophren..L

•

v Hallucination^ work vV i LA l ti person v. no has schizophrenia \R IS3 2'M

9

:

Moreover, Potter found no diagnosis of schizophrenia in any of the prior treatment
programs in which defendant had been involved for alcohol abuse (R. 183:25).
Furthermore, even if defendant was suffering from some kind of schizophrenia, that did
not mean he could not competently enter a plea (R. 183:21). Indeed, if defendant suffered
from schizophrenia to the extent that he required medication and, as was the case here,
defendant was not taking his medication at the time of his plea, the judge would "have
some question about whether or not this person was actually able to make that plea or
not"(R. 183:28).
Dr. Hawks prepared two reports evaluating defendant. The initial report was
prepared on October 10, 2002 (R. 179:Hawks' 1st Rep. at 3). The second report,
prepared after more investigation and monitoring, was prepared on January 6, 2003 (R.
179:Hawks' 2nd Rep. at 3).
In his first report, Hawks stated that defendant "appeared to exhibit schizophreniclike symptoms e.g. flat affect, mental confusion, thought blocking, etc." (R. 179:Hawks'
1st Rep. at 5). Hawks further noted that defendant "did appear credible in his
presentation and seemed to be suffering from a serious mental illness" (Id.) (emphasis
omitted). Consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(4)(a), Hawks found:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

[that defendant] did not appear to comprehend or to
appreci?/ the charges or allegations against him;
[that defendant] did not demonstrate an ability [to] disclose to
counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind;
[that defendant] did not adequately comprehend or
appreciate[] the range and nature of possible penalties;
[that defendant] did not portray the ability to engage in
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options;
10

v.
vi.
v ii.

[that it wasj u
- it defendant under stood tl le ad * - ei sai y
nature of the
dings against him;
fthatd'^^-*
McK to manifest appropriate behavior;
and
Lthai defendant] might not be likely to testify relevantly.

(R 179:Hawks' 1st Rep. at 4-5).
"Mill,, Hawks noted that dclendunl n A m»i i nopei ili\ i ' ill

Il lllne

necessarj tests to i nak 5 a differential diagnosis" (R. 179:Hawks' 1st Rt*p at 3).
Moreover, "in this examiner's opinion malingering (faking mentalk ill* ha> not Kvr
sufficient1- paled ~r/" (Id ^ "* i.-..

*[i]t is this examiner's opinion a more ca .

L-sali
\\

iliilr 1 io'fHliil In iiui

:•

IrVrrtrn-

Kuuawi\\ mental condition" (Id.).
" he November 20 hearing, Hawks testified that defendant appeared to have

problems in almost all areas of competencv .
ii lfoi i 1 latioi 1 he recer > ed from MHIH

t
11 al :: ontacts, such as personnel from the

jail, andernimed this conclusion (R. 183.31) Moreover, defendant refused to complete
some of the testing that would have been useful for a morc dclinitn c e\ aluaiir;
1^3 'I

u

l

1 111.ill,, al UM',1 « m< ,'M'h '.',?' Ihvks mid,. K1.1 1 IHendant 1 m]i iin/.l • 1

kind of validity scale; thus, defendant could easily lie if he wanted to appear incompetent
7

'

*-~; 42, 55). Consequently, Hawks testified, he was "worr[ied] about [his] opinions"

1 asth H.iwks rlanfml ilut luis snminaiion involved defendant's present
competency. Additional testing and research would be necessary before Hawks could

11

offer an opinion as to defendant's competency at the time he entered his plea (R. 183:49,
54). Still, Hawks noted that, if defendant knew enough to file a motion to withdraw his
plea within thirty days of entering it, that would suggest that defendant had some
knowledge of courtroom proceedings and that he was understanding the judge at the time
of his plea (R. 183:39-40). In addition, if defendant wrote the withdrawal motion on his
own, that would support a conclusion that he was more likely malingering than mentally
ill (R. 183:58). Hawks concluded that reviewing the plea videotape would be useful in
making that determination (R. 183:59).
After Hawks' testimony, defense counsel asked the court to have Hawks complete
the additional testing and review necessary to determine defendant's competency at the
time of his plea (R. 183:61). The trial court agreed with counsel's suggestion (R. 183:6364). In addition, the court ordered that a third alienist be appointed (Id.).
Dr. Hawks' second report was prepared in response to the trial court's order.
Unlike for his first report, this time Hawks reviewed the videotape of defendant's plea
hearing and numerous grievances defendant had filed while he was incarcerated,
including four he wrote during the same month he entered his plea (R. 179: Hawks' 2nd
Rep. at 3, 11; R. 184:12-13, 14, 16). In addition, Hawks interviewed defendant two more
times and then observed him without his knowledge while he was outside his cell one day
using the phone and communicating with other inmates or jail personnel (R. 179:Hawks'
2nd Rep. at 3; R. 184:7, 17). Finally, Hawks interviewed numerous medical and non-

12
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On January 28, 2003, Hawks provided testimony explaining his second report. As
he had done in his report, Hawks explained that, in addition to doing additional testing on
defendant, Hawks consulted collateral sources to determine defendant's competency on
the day he entered his plea (R. 184:8-14). Whereas for his last report Hawks relied
primarily on his interviews with defendant and the results of a few tests conducted on
defendant, this time Hawks compared defendant's conduct during his interviews and
defendant's test results with information derived from the plea video, from jail personnel,
from his own observations of defendant outside his cell during his free time, and from the
grievances defendant wrote while incarcerated (R. 184:8-14). The information Hawks
obtained from these other sources—that defendant could use the telephone; could
communicate intelligently with other inmates and jail personnel; could recall incidents
that had or were happening; and could articulate grievances, for example—was
dramatically different from how defendant presented himself during the interviews and
through his tests, one of which measured his intellectual age as 5.3 years old (R. 184:814, 16-19). These dramatic differences convinced Hawks that defendant was
malingering, i.e., that he was exaggerating any mental illness he had (R. 184:13).
The third alienist appointed was Beverly O'Connor, a clinical neuropsychologist
(R. 184:26). As part of her evaluation, O'Connor met with defendant twice, and reviewed
the first report Dr. Hawks had prepared, as well as Mr. Potter's report (R.
179:0'Connor's Rep. at 1-2). O'Connor noted in her report that, during her interviews,
defendant's "speech was often poorly articulated," and she "frequently had to have him
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defendant "appeared to have some difficulty comprehending the interview questions
accurately at times" (Id.). Further, defendant reported both/that he heard voices that upset'
him, som.eti.mes and """also reported soi i i,e " • isi lal 1: lallucinatioi is""" ' ( "' i /.) I:inallj - O'C :)i n i : i
in itt/t 1 llul I nil t test ili/su'iinl lii measure defendant's overall level of intellectual
functioning, defendant showed "severe problem^ *.- m v e r -al intellectual abilities" and
"some difficulty with complex, attention, and ^oncentratk-. •.»« :.
liascd mi llliin ulm,i!\ alum. <H mn

-

A

- JI iffered from

either a delusional disorder or a schizophrenic disorder thai 'likely causes him to have an
' have a rational or ut-AnJ understanding of the proceedings against him or of
the punishment ^ p e i n . . . tor tne oiienst . .,
111.if ilrfendanC

-

.
'

-v

- -mpairments result in an

inability to consult Willi ins counsel or participate n. he proceedings against him with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding," let alone "engage in any fully reasoned

to appreciate and comprehend the full nature of the charge against him," and "it is
questionable if he wil1 m .:' V to disclose to his counsel pertinent facts, events, and states
of mind during the inciGi-n: * ,:,.*. .. •,.. icd iiui ilit" t. IitiiJJ,CS"' (/</ ai "mi Hased mi liri
obsei \ " ati ::n is, O'Coi n 101 conch ided that defendant "was most like!" Filncompetent at the
time he both entered his plea and withdrew his plea

v \.

"the possibility of malingering cannot be totally ruled out" •: 4l*

15

O'Connor also noted that
i lowever, she suspected

defendant did not have "enough . . . intellectual ability or psychological sophistication to
malinger in an effective or convincing manner" (Id.).
O'Connor's testimony at the January 28 hearing was much more equivocal on
defendant's competency than was her report. Agreeing that her report indicated
defendant might be malingering, O'Connor offered that she "ha[s] a lot of questions about
this defendant" (R. 184:27).
She also testified that, although she had not read Dr. Hawk's second report prior to
doing her evaluation, what he had done there—talking with other people to find out what
defendant was like in his day-to-day living—was a good idea (R. 184:28-29). She also
would have found it useful to review the grievances defendant had written and to watch
defendant during his free periods, as Dr. Hawks had done (R. 184:29-30).
O'Connor explained that she was not aware defendant had written any grievances
and did not know she could request to observe defendant outside of her interviews (R.
184:29-30); however, where her concern was that defendant had a probable mental
illness, a low verbal IQ, and verbal comprehension difficulties, that information would
have helped her more accurately determine defendant's verbal skills as well as whether
defendant was faking his condition (R. 184:30-31, 35-36). O'Connor acknowledged that,
although her opinion was that defendant was not faking anything while he took the tests,
it was possible that he was distorting his problems (R. 184:33-34).
O'Connor concluded her testimony by stating, "I did have concerns [regarding
whether defendant was faking things] and that's why I recommended that he be put
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somewhere where he can be observed more closely . . . — and that's basically some of
what Dr. Hawks did. He had a chance to set up some kind of a way to where he could
observe [defendant] . . . [w]ithout him knowing" (R. 184:37).
After the January 28th hearing, the trial court ruled:
After reviewing everything and after listening to everything,
I've come to the conclusion that, in fact, Mr. Walls was competent to
enter his plea, that he did knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea.
If in fact he had been at the level of a five year old, I do not
believe—in my—my assessment and given my experience, hav[ing]
taken hundreds of these pleas, I think I would have at least been able
to assess whether he was functioning at that low level of intellect.
That strikes me as being very significant.
. . . In fact, I believe one portion of the plea Mr. Gravis
volunteered information that he'd been talking with him and that Mr.
Walls had been asking appropriate questions and that he assessed
him to be fine. And that was voluntary on his part just simply
because I guess Mr. Walls started making some comments during the
plea, which I believe I followed up on and which he followed up on
himself and responded to.
So I don't know that the fact that this wasn't noticed earlier is
anything other than it wasn't there to be noticed probably, as much
as anything.. . .
And I'm also relying on Dr. Hawks' follow-up information of
getting some information from collateral sources who are in a
position to actually see his behavior on an ongoing basis. And what
I'm seeing here are just a lot of inconsistencies in the way he
presents himself. . . .
But the most telling thing is what he's like when he doesn't
think anybody is watching or analyzing him. And that is when the
jailers are able to observe his behavior and use of the phone, his
complaints, his cognitive processing in even being able to complain
or assess-you know, telling them what the situation is that he's
complaining about. All those things add up to me to be
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inconsistency to the point of preponderating toward malingering in
this case.
And I don't come to this conclusion lightly because, frankly,
I—I'm like any one of you here that if someone is not able to enter a
plea or has done it incompetently then there are other mechanisms
that we have to— have to exhaust to either get them to the point
where they can be competent or — or otherwise review it. But I
don't think that's the situation here.
And so for all those reasons I'm going to find that the plea
was competent, was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
(R. 184:51-53).
The trial court did not enter a formal order denying defendant's motion. Instead,
the trial court proceeded to sentence defendant to serve five-years-to-life in prison and to
pay restitution for his crime (R. 162-63; R. 184:57-58).
Defendant timely appealed from that final judgment (R. 165). The supreme court
subsequently transferred the matter to this Court for disposition. See April 14, 2003
Order.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue I. Defendant raises two claims that the trial court erred under rule 11 in
finding that his plea was voluntary. However, neither of these claims were raised below.
Although this Court has previously held that such claims can be reached under the plain
error doctrine, this Court should overrule that precedent as lacking analytical support and
contrary to the plain language of the plea statute. It should then reject defendant's claims
as not properly before this Court.
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Alternatively, this Court should reject defendant's claims as invited error where
defendant repeatedly told the lower court during discussions on his motion to withdraw
that the court's "rule 11 colloquy was done adequately and, in fact, even more than . . .
adequately."
Finally, defendant's claims fail on their merits. First, the evidence before the trial
court at the time of defendant's plea did not indicate any competency issue. Thus, the
trial court did not plainly err in accepting defendant's plea without ordering a competency
proceeding. Second, at the plea hearing, defendant affirmatively indicated his
understanding that a letter from the State concerning defendant's sentence was not
binding on the parole board. Because defendant was aware of the value of the State's
promise to send the letter, the trial court did not plainly err in accepting defendant's plea
based on that promise.
Issue II. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because there is "doubt as to the Defendant's mental state" at the
time he entered his plea. However, defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting the
trial court's malingering finding. Thus, defendant's claim fails.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS
THAT HIS PLEA WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF RULE 11
WHERE DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE THOSE CLAIMS IN HIS
MOTION TO WITHDRAW BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea because his plea was not voluntary under Rule 11. Aplt. Br. at 17, 23.
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Defendant claims first that his plea was not voluntary under rule 11 because he was not
competent at the time he entered it. Aplt. Br. at 17. He claims second that his plea was
not voluntary under rule 11 because the State's promise to write a letter to the Board of
Pardons had minimal value, and the trial court "did not make an adequate record to ensure
that the Defendant did in fact understand the nature and value of any promises made to
him." Aplt. Br. at 23 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court should reject defendant's rule 11 claims as not properly before this
Court. Alternatively, this Court should reject these claims as invited errors.
A.

Defendant's rule 11 claims are not properly before this Court.

This Court has previously held that it can consider challenges to a plea hearing
raised for the first time on appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw under the plain
error doctrine. See pp. 22-26 infra. Because that holding lacks analytical support and is
inconsistent with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (the plea statute), this
Court should overrule it. After doing so, this Court should reject defendant's rule 11
claims, raised for the first time on appeal, as not properly before this Court.
Importantly, in making the argument set forth below, the State does not argue that
a defendant can never raise a plain error claim on appeal from the denial of a motion to
withdraw. Rather, the State argues only that such plain error claim must relate to the
conduct of the motion court in addressing the claims raised in the defendant's
motion—such as when the motion court proceeds with a pro se defendant without
inquiring as to whether the defendant has waived his right to an attorney. The plain error
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doctrine cannot be manipulated by a defendant to raise new challenges to the trial court's
conduct at the plea hearing where, under the plea statute, defendant was required to raise
those claims before the motion court.
1.

Stare decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis, "'under which the first decision by a court on a
particular question of law governs later decisions by the same court, is a cornerstone of
Anglo-American jurisprudence that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the
fairness of adjudication.'" State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (quoting State
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)). The doctrine therefore imposes strict
requirements on courts to follow the dictates of previously established law. See id. at 399
& n.3. However, "the doctrine is neither mechanical nor rigid as it relates to courts of last
resort." Id. at 399.
"Those asking [this Court] to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of
persuasion." Id. at 398; see also Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, f 12 n.3, 40 P.3d
632. They can succeed only if this Court becomes "'clearly convinced that the rule was
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more
good than harm will come by departing from precedent.'" Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399
(quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill.L.Rev. 367, 367
(1957)); see also Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, f 12 n.3; City ofHildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, ^
36,28P.3d697.
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Still, "'[w]hen precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can be made
to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it.'" Menzies,
889 P.2d at 399 (quoting Francis v. Southern Pac. R.R., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948) (Black,
J., dissenting)). Similarly, the "'[sjtare decisis effect of [a] case is substantially
diminished by the fact that the legal point therein was decided without argument.'" Id.
(quoting 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 193 (1965)).
This Court's decisions reaching claims raised for the first time on appeal from the
denial of a motion to withdraw lack analytical support. Moreover, they are inconsistent
with the plain language of the plea statute. Consequently, this Court should overrule
those decisions.
2.

The lack of analytical support for this Court's precedent
allowing appellate courts to reach new claims raised for
the first time on appeal from the denial of a motion to
withdraw a plea detracts from its stare decisis force.

The State has found no Utah Supreme Court case considering a claim raised for the
first time on appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 319 (Utah 1998), did hold that an appellate court could reach a
claim challenging a plea "for the first time on appeal if plain error or exceptional
circumstances exist" where defendant had not filed a motion to withdraw. However, at
the time, the statute governing motions to withdraw pleas contained no time limit for
filing them. Thus, the supreme court could have easily determined that any decision by it
not to reach the issue on appeal would merely mean that the issue would reappear after
defendant raised the issue in a subsequent motion to withdraw. That interpretation is
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consistent with the supreme court's recent discussion of Marvin, in which the court held
that Marvin no longer applies now that the plea statute limits the time for filing motions
to thirty days. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, If 4, 40 P.3d 630.
Nonetheless, this Court has previously reached such plain error issues, even when
defendant's claims do not attack the motion proceeding but instead attempt to smuggle in
previously unclaimed errors in the plea hearing. See, e.g. State v. Dean, 2002 UT App
323,ffl[8-9, 57 P.3d 1106 (rejecting State's argument that issues on appeal from denial of
motion to withdraw should be limited to issues raised below), cert, granted, 64 P.3d 586
(Utah 2003); State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ^ 5, 47 P.3d 101 (reaching claim for first
time on appeal where timely motion to withdraw filed below), cert, granted, 59 P.3d 603
(Utah 2002); State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, K 11, 5 P.3d 1222 (reaching rule 11
claim for first time on appeal even though untimely motion to withdraw deprived trial
court of jurisdiction), overruled by State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, % 4, 40 P.3d 630 (holding
appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider plain error challenge to plea where no
timely motion to withdraw filed); State v. Ostler (Ostler I), 2000 UT App 28, ^ 8, 996
P.2d 1065 (reaching rule 11 claim for first time on appeal even though untimely motion to
withdraw deprived trial court of jurisdiction), affirmed on other grounds by State v. Ostler
(Ostler II), 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528 (affirming based on conclusion that motion to
withdraw was timely filed in trial court; not reaching propriety of court of appeals' plain
error decision); State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah App. 1990) (reaching
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unpreserved claim for plain error where defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw);
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah App. 1989) (per curiam) (same).
However, the analytical bases in these cases for reaching such unpreserved claims
is not strong. For example, in Valencia, this Court decided to reach the plain error issue
with no analysis of the propriety of that action except a citation to Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). See Valencia, 116 P.2d at 1334 ("'It was error, plain on the
face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an
affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.'") (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at
242).
Boykin, however, was a direct appeal in a capital murder case in which the
reviewing court was mandated by statute "to comb the record for any error prejudicial to
the appellant, even though not called to [the court's] attention in brief of counsel."
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 241 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v.
Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^ 67, 57 P.3d 977 (holding that because of special nature of death
penalty, court can reach issue on appeal not raised below or briefed by parties; however,
court's authority does not abrogate defendant's burden to preserve and brief issues), cert,
denied, 537 U.S. 863 (2002); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 552-53 (Utah 1987).
Because no such statute or case law exists in appeals from motions to withdraw,
Boykin provides no support for the Valencia court's decision to apply the plain error
doctrine to claims that were not raised before the trial court in a timely motion to
withdraw.
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Pharris then relied on Valencia and State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah
1987). See Pharris, 798 P.2d at 774. Valencia, as previously discussed, provides only
weak support for that holding. Gibbons provides none. In Gibbons, the defendant had
not filed a motion to withdraw his plea, and thus had not raised his claims below, but
instead apparently challenged his plea on direct appeal from his conviction. See Gibbons,
740 P.2d at 1311. The State argued that the court should not reach the defendant's
unpreserved claims even under the plain error doctrine. See id. The court in fact
accepted the State's position. See id. Instead of reaching the defendant's claims, the
supreme court noted that the plea statute then in effect "sets no time limit for filing a
motion to withdraw the plea" and then remanded the matter to the trial court "to enable
defendant to file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas." Id. The Gibbons court noted:
"This disposition is . . . consonant with the policy of allowing trial judges to have the
opportunity to address an alleged error." Id. at 1312.
In Ostler I, this Court relied on Marvin, 964 P.2d at 318, and State v. Price, 837
P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App. 1992), to hold that it had jurisdiction to consider a plain error
claim on appeal even absent a timely motion to withdraw. See Ostler, 996 P.2d at 1068.
As already discussed, the supreme court has since held that Marvin was decided when the
plea statute contained no time limitation for filing motions to withdraw and that Marvin
no longer applies now that the plea statute limits the time for filing motions to withdraw
to thirty days. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, U 4, 40 P.3d 630. Although Price
discussed a claim raised for the first time on appeal, it later decided that discussion was
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unnecessary because defendant's motion to withdraw was not filed within the statutory
time limit. See Price, 837 P.2d at 583-84. Finally, the plain error part of Ostler was
overruled in Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^f 4, which held that an appellate court cannot use plain
error to reach a claim over which the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the failure to
file a timely motion to withdraw.
Because Tarnawiecki relied solely on Ostler I, Tarnawiecki provides no greater
insight as to the propriety of using plain error to reach a claim raised for the first time on
appeal in this context. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, ^f 11. Nor does Hittle, which
cited Tarnawiecki and then unrelated general case law defining plain error. See Hittle,
2002 UT App 134, f 5.
Finally, Dean did not cite to any of this case law to justify its decision to reach a
plain error claim. Rather, Dean reached the defendant's plain error claim merely by
concluding that because Reyes—which held that an appellate court cannot reach a plain
error claim when a defendant has not filed a timely motion to withdraw—is
distinguishable, it "does not preclude this court from reviewing [the defendant's] plain
error argument." Dean, 2002 UT App 323, ^ 9.
Thus, although this Court has repeatedly reached challenges to the plea taking that
are raised for the first time on appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw, neither this
Court nor the supreme court has ever seriously analyzed the propriety of that result,
particularly in light of the plain language of the plea statute and case law interpreting it.
Consequently, the stare decisis value of this precedent is, at best, weak. Cf. Menzies, 889
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P.2d at 399 (noting "4[s]tare decisis effect of [a] case is substantially diminished by the
fact that the legal point therein was decided without argument'") (citation omitted); id.
(noting '"[w]hen precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can be made to
support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it'") (citation
omitted). An analysis of the plea statute and case law addressing its purposes
demonstrates that such precedent is in fact clearly erroneous and should be overruled.
See id.
3.

Precedent allowing appellate courts to reach claims raised
for the first time on appeal from the denial of a motion to
withdraw a plea is inconsistent with the plain language of
the plea statute; thus, this Court should reject it.

This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ^ 25, 4 P.3d 795; see also Brixen &
Christopher Architects, P.C. v. State, 2001 UT App 210, ^ 14, 29 P.3d 650. In doing so,
this Court "assume[s] that 'each term in a statute was used advisedly.'" Stephens v.
Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). In addition,
"statutory term[s] should be interpreted and applied according to [their] usually accepted
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an application that is
neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express
purpose of the statute." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, f 9, 36 P.3d 533 (citations
omitted).
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Utah's plea statute provides:
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to
conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon
good cause shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made
by motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the
plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person
under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(1999).3
Under the plain language of this statute, a defendant may challenge his guilty or no
contest plea in two ways: either as part of his criminal case by filing a motion to
withdraw, or as a collateral challenge by filing a petition for post-conviction relief. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2), (3) (1999).
If the challenge is made collaterally, the breadth of the challenge is defined by the
rules applicable to post-conviction petitions. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(3).
If the challenge is made as part of the criminal case, the challenge "must be in the
context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the denial of which can be appealed."
Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah App. 1988). That context is defined by
section 77-13-6(2).

3

Section 77-13-6 was substantially amended effective May 5, 2003. See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (Supp. 2003). However, the substantive changes in the amended
statute do not alter the analysis that follows.
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As set forth above, section 77-13-6(2)(a) provides that "[a] plea of guilty or no
contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a). Section 77-13-6(2)(b) then provides that a request to
withdraw a plea "is made by motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of
the plea." Id. § 77-13-6(2)(b).
Read together, the plain language of these provisions establishes three principles
applicable to challenges to pleas made "in the context of a motion to withdraw."
Summers, 759 P.2d at 344.
First, defendant must begin the process by filing a motion in the trial court within
thirty days of his plea. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b); see also Reyes, 2002 UT 13,
U 3; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; Price, 837 P.2d at 583.
Second, defendant's motion must show to the trial court that good cause exists for
his plea to be withdrawn. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a); see also State v.
Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994) ( holding plea statute imposes upon
defendant a "burden to show good cause" before a trial court must consider withdrawal of
his plea); State v. Mildenhall, 1M P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987) ("Defendant has failed to
show good cause why the [trial] court should have exercised its discretion to allow
withdrawal of the plea.").
Finally, "withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a right, that is left to the
trial court 's sound discretion," Brocksmith, 888 P.2d at 704 (emphasis added); see also
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a); Mildenhall 747 P.2d at 424; State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d
1040, 1041 (Utah 1987).
Each of these requirements is consistent with the well-established principle that
appellate courts "will not interfere with a trial judge's determination that a defendant has
failed to show good cause unless it clearly appears that the trial judge abused his
discretion." State v. Mildenhall 141 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987).
Nothing in the plain language of the plea statute allows a defendant to forego filing
a motion in the trial court and instead first challenge his plea on appeal. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b); see also Reyes, 2002 UT 13, U 3; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; Price,
837P.2dat583.
Similarly, nothing in the plain language of the plea statute allows a defendant to
file a motion in the trial court, have that motion denied because it did not demonstrate
good cause, and then use that denial as a means to raise new claims on appeal that were
never presented to the court below. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a); Brocksmith,
888 P.2d at 704 (Utah App. 1994). In fact, such result is anathema to the plain language
of the statute.
As this Court recognized in Summers, the purpose of requiring a defendant to first
move in the trial court is to "giv[e] the court who took the plea the first chance to consider
defendant's arguments." Summers, 759 P.2d at 342; see also Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312
(holding, under statute allowing filing of motion at any time, that remand to trial court to
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consider claim raised for first time on appeal was proper as "consonant with the policy of
allowing trial judges to have the opportunity to address an alleged error").
That purpose is destroyed if a defendant may raise new challenges to his plea for
the first time on appeal. Indeed, by allowing a defendant to forgo presenting claims to the
trial court and nonetheless have them heard on appeal, this Court has done nothing less
than rewritten the plea statute both to relieve the defendant of his statutory duty to show
good cause in his trial court motion since he can raise new claims on appeal, and to
impose upon trial courts a sua sponte duty to conduct a plenary review of the
circumstances of defendant's plea or risk being overturned on bases never presented to it.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a). Neither of these results is consistent with the
statute's plain language. See id.
Consequently, for the same reason appellate courts cannot consider a claim raised
for the first time on appeal where a defendant has not filed a timely motion to withdraw,
see Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^ 3; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; Price, 837 P.2d at 583, appellate
courts should not reach a claim raised for the first time on appeal where a defendant has
filed a timely motion to withdraw. In both cases, defendant has failed to bring his claim
before the trial court in the manner prescribed by statute. In both cases, defendant should
be precluded from having that claim addressed for the first time on appeal.
Because this Court's precedent holding that it can reach a claim for the first time
on appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw is not well-supported analytically, and
because that precedent is inconsistent with the plea statute, this Court should overrule it.
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Instead, this Court should hold, consistent with the plea statute, that only claims raised
before the trial court in a timely motion to withdraw will be considered on appeal from
denial of that motion.
4.

Under a proper interpretation of the plea statute,
defendant's rule 11 claims, raised for the first time on
appeal, are not properly before this Court.

Defendant in this case filed a motion to withdraw. That motion, however, did not
include either of the rule 11 claims now raised on appeal. Consequently, this Court
should reject those claims as not properly before this Court.
B.

Even if this Court concludes defendant's rule 11 claims are
properly before this Court, this Court should reject them as
invited error.

Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in finding his
plea voluntary under rule 11 because "[defendant was suffering from a significant mental
illness, and was not taking his prescribed medication at the time the plea was taken."
Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant also claims for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred
in finding his plea voluntary under rule 11 because the court "did not make an adequate
record to ensure that the [defendant did in fact understand the nature and value of any
promises made to him." Aplt. Br. at 23 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
Even if these claims are properly before this Court, they should be rejected as invited
errors.
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Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "[t]he court... may not
accept [a guilty] plea until the court has found . . . the plea is voluntarily made." Utah R.
Crim.P. 11(e)(2).
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court
record before an appellate court will review such claim[s] on appeal."' State v. Johnson,
114 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987)); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, U 11, 10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule
"applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional
circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at ^f 11.
Moreover, if defendant led the trial court into the error he now claims on appeal, his claim
will not be reached by this Court even for plain error but, instead, will be rejected as
invited error. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (holding that, "'[i]f a
party through counsel.. . has led the trial court into error, [this Court] will then decline to
save that party from the error'") (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah
1989)) (emphasis omitted); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
Defendant made no claim in his motion to withdraw before the trial court that the
court had erred under rule 11 in finding that he was entering his plea voluntarily (R.
181:13; R. 183:10; R. 184:45-48). To the contrary, defendant repeatedly told the trial
court that its colloquy at the plea hearing satisfied the requirements of rule 11 and that he
found no error during the plea proceedings (R. 183:10; R. 184:45-48). Under such

33

circumstances, defendant invited any error in the trial court's failure to find a rule 11 error
in those proceedings.
Consequently, defendant's claims fail.
C.

Even if this Court reaches defendant's rule 11 claims, they fail
on their merits.

As discussed above, defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding his plea
voluntary under rule 11 because "[defendant was suffering from a significant mental
illness, and was not taking his prescribed medication at the time the plea was taken."
Aplt. Br. at 17. Alternatively, defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding his
plea voluntary under rule 11 because the court "did not make an adequate record to
ensure that the [djefendant did in fact understand the nature and value of any promises
made to him." Aplt. Br. at 23 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Neither
of defendant's claims has merit.
Because defendant did not raise either of these claims below, neither succeeds
unless defendant can establish plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 10 P.3d
346; State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d
566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). To show plain error, defendant must demonstrate (1) that an
error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that
the error was prejudicial. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "[t]he court. . . may not
accept [a guilty] plea until the court has found . . . the plea is voluntarily made." Utah R.
Cnm. P. 11(e)(2).
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1.

Defendant's competency claim fails where the evidence
before the trial court at the time of the defendant's plea
did not indicate any competency issue.

Rule 11 only addresses the trial court's duties prior to accepting a plea. See Utah
R. Crim. P. 11(e) (identifying what trial court must find prior to accepting plea). Thus,
defendant's claim must be that the trial court erred in not finding defendant incompetent
at the time he entered his plea.
However, absent a competency petition, "'[a] trial court must hold a competency
hearing [only] when there is "a substantial question of possible doubt as to a defendant's
competency at the time of the guilty plea.'"" State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, \ 49, 63 P.3d
731 (quoting Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, % 13, 20 P.3d 382 (quoting State v. Holland,
921 P.2d 430, 435 (Utah 1996))). Moreover, in reviewing whether a trial court erred in
not holding such a hearing, this Court "'considers] only those facts that were before the
[trial] court when the plea was entered.'" Jacobs, 2001 UT 17, f 18 (quoting York v.
Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 595 (Utah App. 1994)) (second alteration in original); see also

Argiielles,2m\li:

1,1|50.

Here, the only evidence before the trial court at the time of defendant's plea even
hinting that defendant might have a mental problem was that he had been prescribed two
medications while at the jail and that he was not taking either of them (R. 186:9).
However, when asked by the court why the medication had been prescribed, defendant
never mentioned a possible mental illness (R. 186:10). Instead, he merely replied that he
could not remember (R. 186:10).
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All the remaining evidence before the trial court at the time of defendant's plea
overwhelmingly indicated defendant's competency. Defendant responded appropriately
to every question asked by the court (R. 186:2-13, 15). On multiple occasions, defendant
expressly told the court that he understood what he was pleading to, the sentence which
applied to his crime, and the rights he was giving up as a result of his plea (R. 186:2-8,
10). In addition, once, after nodding to the judge in response to a question and being told
that he had to respond aloud, defendant followed the court's direction, verbalizing his
answer (R. 186:2-3). Finally, when the issue turned to the medication defendant had been
prescribed, defense counsel interjected that he had "talked to Mr. Walls extensively twice
over the last couple of weeks and he has shown that he has understood what we've talked
about and we've engaged in reasonable discussions. He's understood and asked relevant
questions" (R. 186:10).
In light of this evidence, there was no "substantial question of possible doubt as to
. . . defendant's competency at the time of [his] guilty plea." Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^ 49.
Consequently, the trial court did not err under rule 11 in accepting defendant's plea
without first ordering further evaluations on his competency. See id.
2.

Defendant's illusory promise claim fails where defendant
indicated he understood that the State's promise to send a
letter to the parole board might have no impact on the
parole board's sentencing determination.

Before accepting a plea, the trial court has a duty to ensure that the defendant
"understand[s] the nature and value of any promises made to him.'" State v. Copeland,
765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305,1 11, 57
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P.3d 238 (reversing denial of motion to withdraw plea where trial court's "legal error
exaggerated the benefits [defendant] would receive from pleading guilty"). The record
here establishes that the trial court fulfilled that duty.
When the trial court learned that defendant had agreed to plead guilty in return for
the State's promise to send a letter to the parole board requesting that defendant serve
only between ten and twelve years of the statutory five-years-to-life prison term (R.
186:2), the trial court informed defendant that the charge to which he was pleading
carried an indeterminate sentence of five years to life in prison (R. 186:7). The court then
specifically told defendant: "You should also be aware that just because the State writes
a letter to the parole authority doesn't mean they have to follow their recommendation"
(R. 186:7). Defendant replied, "Yeah, I've been told that" (R. 186:7). The court then
stated, "So you shouldn't rely on anything that the State has indicated they may or may
not do in entering this sentence because you could serve a lot longer than what they're
going to recommend" (R. 186:7-8). Defendant responded, "Yeah, I know" (R. 186:8).
This dialogue establishes that defendant understood both the nature and value of
the State's promise. Thus, contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court "did . . .
make an adequate record to ensure that the Defendant did in fact 'understand the nature
and value of any promises made to him.'" Aplt. Br. at 23 (citation omitted). That the
prosecutor's letter was not binding on the parole board does not render the State's
promise illusory. Cf. State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1302 (Utah App. 1989) ("Where
[the] defendant is aware that there is no guarantee the court will agree to follow the
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prosecutor's recommendation, there is no reason to set aside a guilty plea if the court did
not follow the prosecutor's recommendation, even if the defendant is disappointed with
the severity of the sentence.").
Consequently defendant's claim fails.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM THAT HE WAS INCOMPETENT TO
PLEAD GUILTY WHERE DEFENDANT FAILS TO MARSHAL
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S
MALINGERING FINDING
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. See Aplt. Br. at 17. According to defendant, "[ajlthough [two
of the examining alienists] believed that the Defendant was malingering, and [the third]
conceded that the Defendant might be malingering, there is sufficient doubt as to the
Defendant's mental state at the time of the guilty pleas to require the trial court to allow
the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea." Aplt. Br. at 18. This Court should reject
defendant's claim because he has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial
court's competency ruling.
"It is well established that due process requires that a defendant be mentally
competent to plead guilty and to stand trial." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^ 47, 63 P.3d
731; see also Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, ^ 12, 20 P.3d 382. '"[I]n determining whether
a defendant is competent to plead guilty, the trial court must consider whether the
defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
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proceedings against him.'" Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, <[ 48 (quoting State v. Holland, 921
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (1999) (defining when
defendant is "incompetent to proceed").
'The determination of whether a defendant is competent to proceed . . . is a mixed
question of fact and law." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah 1997).
However, "[t]he trial court's factual findings in support of its determination of
malingering and its accompanying credibility determinations are subject to a clearly
erroneous standard of review." Id.\ State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, \ 45, 20 P.3d 342.
Consequently, where, as here, defendant is essentially challenging the trial court's
malingering finding, he "bears the burden of marshaling all the evidence in favor of the
factual finding that he was malingering and then demonstrating that, even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the court below, that evidence is insufficient to
support the court's finding." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1223-24; see also Arguelles, 2003
UT 1,fflf 67, 68; Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ^ 45.
In this case, the only evidence defendant marshals in support of the trial court's
malingering finding is that "Dr. Hawks, as well as Mr. Potter believed that the Defendant
was malingering (R. 183/23), and Dr. O'Connor conceded that the Defendant might be
malingering (R. 184/27, 33)." Aplt. Br. at 18. Although this evidence alone is sufficient
to support the trial court's malingering finding, defendant's marshaling falls far short of
presenting to this Court all the evidence underlying the alienists' conclusions that further
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support that finding. For example, defendant fails to marshal the following supporting
evidence:
1.

That, during the plea hearing, defendant responded
appropriately to all questions asked by the trial court, spoke
coherently, and indicated he understood everything that was
happening (R. 186:2-13, 15).

2.

That, during the same month in which defendant entered his
plea, defendant filed four grievances with the jail which
showed an ability to recall incidents and articulate
dissatisfaction in a manner inconsistent with incompetency
(R. 179:Hawks' 2nd Rep. at 4, 11; R. 184:8-14, 16-19).

3.

That, according to Rhett Potter, defendant's "[r]ecent and
remote memory were intact" and defendant's "letters to the
Court and to his defense attorney show a good grasp of the
charges, the judicial process, and alternative defenses" (R.
179: Potter's Rep. at 2).

4.

That, according to Mr. Potter, defendant's claim of hearing
voices was inconsistent with schizophrenia and "seem[ed] to
be a convenient explanation/excuse for [defendant's]
behavior," "a manipulative device" used by defendant (R.
179:Potter'sRep. at2;R. 183:20).

5.

That, according to Mr. Potter, if defendant was truly suffering
from schizophrenia at the time of his plea to the extent he
required medication, and, as was the case here, defendant was
not taking his medication at that time, the judge would "have
some question about whether or not this person was actually
able to make that plea or not" (R. 183:28).

6.

That Dr. Hawks' initial evaluation of defendant as
incompetent was based almost exclusively on defendant's
performance on certain tests, at least one of which contained
no internal validity scale (R. 183:30, 42, 55). Moreover,
because defendant refused to complete additional testing that
would have allowed for a more definitive evaluation and
because the results of defendant's tests did not conform to
information Dr. Hawks received from collateral contacts at
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the jail, Dr. Hawks was "worrfied] about [the accuracy of his
initial] opinions" (R. 183:31-33, 34).
7.

That, after evaluating defendant further, Dr. Hawks concluded
that, although defendant's "behavior on the IQ test" suggested
he was "[s]everely mentally retarded" with an intellectual age
of 5.3 years old, those results were "not consistent with
behavior described by others" who observed defendant at the
prison, or with Dr. Hawks' own observations of
defendant—when defendant didn't know it—which showed
an ability to interaction, communicate, and function that
indicated defendant "was not experiencing any significant
mental illness or mental defect" (R. 179:Hawks' 2nd Rept. at
3,4,5,7, 10; R. 184:8-14,16-19).

8.

That, according to Dr. Hawks, defendant "has been
exaggerating his emotional and intellectual problems," and
was in fact malingering (R. 179:Hawks' 2nd Rep. at 5, 10; R.
184:13).

9.

That, although Ms. O'Connor's report indicated a conclusion
that defendant was not competent when he entered his plea,
her report also noted that "the possibility of malingering
cannot be totally ruled out" and that further observation of
defendant was recommended (R. 179:0'Connor's Rep. at 9;
R. 184:37).

10.

That Ms. O'Connor testified that she reached her conclusions
after meeting with defendant twice and reviewing Mr. Potter's
report and Dr. Hawks' initial report, and that further
observations of defendant and his writings—like those
conducted by Dr. Hawks—would have helped her more
accurately determine whether defendant was faking his
condition (R. 184:29-31, 35, 37).

All this evidence supports the trial court's finding that defendant was malingering.
See, e.g., Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,ffi[48-50 (holding that trial court could properly give less
credence to alienists who questioned defendant's competency where their underlying
analysis was weaker than other alienists and where court could also draw on its own prior
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observations of defendant); Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224 (holding "record reveals ample
evidence supporting the trial court's determination of malingering" where, although some
alienists based their incompetency determinations on defendant's "inability to express or
understand verbal communications," "[t]he record is replete with evidence of faking on
this point").
Because defendant does not marshal any of this evidence, let alone explain why
this evidence is insufficient to support the findings underlying the trial court's
competency ruling, defendant's challenge to that ruling fails.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction
and sentence.

</ October 2003.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED J^j_

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK'
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

Addendum A

77-13-4

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
( D A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 11

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
le) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(exl) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
ie)'4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
< e n 4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to
the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.

(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.)
Advisory Committee Note. — These
amendments are intended to reflect current law
without any substantive changes The addition
of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis
l
in section ie <
4K B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and
is in accordance with prior case law Eg State
i Breckenndge, 688 P2d 440 (Utah 1983) The
rule now explicitly recognizes pleas under
Sorth Carolina i Alford, 400 U S 25, 91 S Ct
160 27 L Ed 2d 162 * 1970), and sets forth the
factual basis required for those pleas Eg
WWett L Barnes, 842 P2d 860 (Utah 1992)
The amendments explicitly recognize that
plea affidavits, where used, may properly be
incorporated into the record when the trial
The final paragraph of section <e) clarifies
that the trial court may, but need not, advise
defendants concerning collateral consequences
of a guilt\ plea The failure to so advise does not
affect the \ alidity of a plea State v McFadden,
884 P2d 1303 'Utah App 1994). cert denied,
892 P2d 13 'Utah 1995)
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment substituted "sworn statement" for "affida\ i t ' three times in the paragraph following
Subdivision <e>«8>

court determines that the defendant has read
(or been read) the affidavit, understands its
contents, and acknowledges the contents State
v Maguire, 830 P2d 216 (Utah 1991) Proper
incorporation of plea affidavits can save the
court time, eliminate some of the monotony of
rote recitations of rights waived by pleading
guilty, and allow a more focused and probing
inquiry into the facts of the offense, the relationship of the law to those facts, and whether
the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered
These benefits are contingent on a careful and
considered review of the affidavit by the defendant and proper care by the trial court to verify
that such a review has actually occurred
The 2002 amendment substituted "written
statement" for "sworn statement" and twice
deleted "sworn" before "statement" in the second-to-last paragraph in Subdivision (e)
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of
pleas, plea discussions or related statements.
U R E 410
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea
of guilty or no contest, § 77-13-6

